In 1934 he has written the story of film named 'pradarshid mazdoor' (exhibited labor) and without completing the contract period of one year, leaving two months wages he has fled to Banaras, because of Bombay(modern Mumbai) and more than that he cannot go in hand with the air and water of filmy atmosphere. १९३४ में प्रदर्शित मजदूर नामक फिल्म की कथा लिखी और कंट्रेक्ट की साल भर की अवधि पूरी किये बिना ही दो महीने का वेतन छोड़कर बनारस भाग आये क्योंकि बंबई (आधुनिक मुंबई) का और उससे भी ज़्यादा वहाँ की फिल्मी दुनिया का हवा-पानी उन्हें रास नहीं आया।
12.
Intelligence. Israel now has in orbit a fleet of super-spy satellites, such as the Ofek-7 launched in 2007, that can regularly capture images of Iran's nuclear and defense sites for the air force's target list. With such constant satellite coverage, it is a safe assumption that war planners have studied Iran's high-value facilities and have a tactic for how to strike each one. Israel has added expertise in analyzing such sites since it produces atomic weapons. कुल मिलाकर रास और लोग का निष्कर्ष है कि इजरायल की वायुसेना की आधुनिकता से इसे वह क्षमता प्राप्त हो गई कि ईरान के अत्यन्त कठोर लक्ष्यों को भी अत्यन्त आत्म विश्वास पूर्वक पूर्ण रूप कर सकता है।
13.
So much attention to the October Surprise theory meant it had to be checked in sober and exhaustive detail, and under such scrutiny it promptly collapsed. Several journalistic investigations started the process, especially Frank Snepp, “Brenneke Exposed,” Village Voice , 10 September 1991; John Barry, “Making of a Myth,” Newsweek , 11 November 1991; Steve Emerson and Jesse Furman, “The Conspiracy That Wasn't,” New Republic , 18 November 1991; and Frank Snepp, “October Surmise,” Village Voice , 25 February 1992. राष्ट्रपति पद के प्रत्याशी रास पेरोट ने गुन्तर रूसबसर से मिसौरी जेल में बातचीत के लिये अपना प्रतिनिधि भेजा और हाउस ऑफ रिप्रजेन्टेटिव ने फरवरी 1992 वोट द्वारा यह फैसला किया कि आरोप की सच्चाई जानने के लिए जाँच होनी चाहिये।
14.
Mr. Pipes ( www.DanielPipes.org ), director of the Middle East Forum, taught for two years at the U.S. Naval War College. A military strike by Israel against Iranian Nuclear Facilities is possible and the optimum route would be along the Syrian-Turkish border then over a small portion of Iraq then into Iran, and back the same route. However, the number of aircraft required, refueling along the way and getting to the targets without being detected or intercepted would be complex and high risk and would lack any assurances that the overall mission will have a high success rate. आधारभूमि - ईरानियों के पास पुरानी तकनीकों का संयोंजन और उच्च तकनीकी इजरायली वायु सेना के समक्ष खड़े होने की ईरानी लड़ाकू विमानों और थलसेना की सीमितता के चलते रास और लांग के अनुसार इजरायल सैन्य बल को पच्चीस - पच्चीस F -15 I S और F -16 I S के छोटे पैकेज की आवश्यकता पड़ेगी ।
15.
Mr. Pike said Israel might be considering another target: the nuclear workers and scientists themselves. “Most of the people who work at these facilities live in housing that is more or less co-located with the facility,” he said. “This makes for a short commute, and facilitates physical and operational security. Bomb the housing, and you destroy the program for a generation.” Dec. 14, 2011 update : It's not generally realized, but the complete military withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq means the country's airspace will be basically open for at least a year, either to Israeli planes flying to Iran or the reverse, until the Iraqi air force is up to par. Presumably this fact reduces the obstacles to an Israeli strike against Iranian nuclear facilities. रास और लांग के विश्लेषण में अन्तर्निहित है परन्तु उन्होंने स्पष्ट रूप से नहीं कहा कि इजरायल सैन्य बल खर्ग प्रायद्वीप में पहुँच सकता है जहाँ से 90 प्रतिशत ईरानी तेल का निर्यात होता है और इस प्रकार ईरानी अर्थ व्यवस्था को बुरी तरह प्रभावित किया जा सकता है ।
16.
Defense forces : Rather than predict the outcome of an Israeli-Iranian confrontation, the authors calculate how many out of the 50 Israeli planes would have to reach their three targets for the operation to succeed. They figure 24 planes must reach Natanz, 6 to Isfahan, and 5 to Arak, or 35 all together. Turned around, that means the Iranian defenders minimally must stop 16 of 50 planes, or one-third of the strike force. The authors consider this attrition rate “considerable” for Natanz and “almost unimaginable” for the other two targets. In all, Raas-Long find that the relentless modernization of Israel's air force gives it “the capability to destroy even well-hardened targets in Iran with some degree of confidence.” Comparing an Iranian operation to Israel's 1981 attack on Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor, which was a complete success, they find this one “would appear to be no more risky” than the earlier one. रास और लांग ने पूर्ण रूप से इसकी सम्भावना पर ध्यान केन्द्रित किया है न कि राजनीतिक इच्छा या रणनीतिक परिणाम पर। क्या इजरायल के राष्ट्रीय कमान को ईरानी आधारभूत अवसंरचना को नष्ट करने का निर्णय लेना चाहिए और क्या इसकी सेना इस मिशन को पूर्ण कर पायेगी ? लेखकों ने सफल आक्रमण के पाँच भागों पर विचार किया है।
17.
An F-15I Platforms : Noting the “odd amalgamation of technologies” available to the Iranians and the limitations of their fighter planes and ground defenses to stand up to the high-tech Israeli air force, Raas-Long calculate that the IDF needs a relatively small strike package of twenty-five F-15Is and twenty-five F-16Is. Routes : Israeli jets can reach their targets via three paths: Turkey to the north, Jordan and Iraq in the middle, or Saudi Arabia to the south. In terms of fuel and cargo, the distances in all three cases are manageable. क्या इजरायल का सैन्य बल वास्तव में ईरान के परमाणु कार्यक्रम को बाधित कर सकता है ? खुफिया एजेन्सियों की शीर्ष गोपनीय विश्लेषणों में ऐसे प्रश्नों का उत्तर दिया जाता है। परन्तु खुले स्रोत का प्रयोग कर प्रतिभाशाली बाहरी लोग अपने अपने हाथ आजमा सकते हैं। व्हिटनी रास और आस्टिन लांग ने मैसच्युएट्स इन्स्टीट्यूट ऑफ टेक्नालाजी में इस समस्या का अध्ययन किया और इण्टरनेशनल सिक्यूरटी में “ Osirak Redux? Assessing Israeli Capabilities to Destroy Iranian Nuclear Facilities ” नामक प्रभावशाली बिश्लेषण प्रस्तुत किया।
18.
Nov. 21, 2013 update : Over six years after the Raas-Long study that inspired the above article, Efraim Inbar of Bar-Ilan University reaches similar conclusions in “A Strike on Iran: Complex, But Possible.” Excerpts: An Israeli strike on Iran's nuclear infrastructure is a risky and militarily-complicated endeavor, but within reach. Israeli ingenuity and determination could lead to a great operational and political success. The international responses are likely to be bearable. … Such an attack would require the capability to reach and destroy distant targets, while overcoming aerial defense systems. Yet the number of facilities that would need to be hit to deal a significant blow to Iran's nuclear infrastructure is generally overestimated. … At a time when appeasing Iran seems to be in vogue, an Israeli strike could invigorate elements in the international arena who are unwilling to accept an Iran with a nuclear breakout capability. In addition, many people around the world would be reminded that muscular reactions to evil regimes are often truly necessary. A decision by Israel to strike Iran would be a historic gamble. Nevertheless, history, necessity, and common sense point toward an attack. इजरायली सैन्य बल के पास अकेले ही ईरान की परमाणु क्षमता के केन्द्रों को नष्ट करने में सफलता प्राप्त करने की क्षमता है, इससे ईरान के परमाणु कार्यक्रम को रोकने में सफलता मिलेगी । इसलिए रास - लांग के अध्ययन में कूटनीतिक सौदे की गुंजायश है। इसके परिणाम सम्भावित रूप से विस्तृत रूप से फैले हुए होने चाहिए ।
19.
Fourth, U.S.-Israel tensions increase Palestinian intransigence and demands. Israel in bad standing empowers their leaders; and if the tensions arise from U.S. pressure for concessions to the Palestinians, the latter sit back and enjoy the show. This happened in mid-2009 , when Mahmoud Abbas instructed Americans what to extract from Jerusalem. Conversely, when U.S.-Israel relations flourish, Palestinian leaders feel pressure to meet Israelis, pretend to negotiate, and sign documents. Combining these four presumptions results in a counterintuitive conclusion: Strong U.S.-Israel ties induce irreversible Israeli mistakes. Poor U.S.-Israel ties abort this process. Obama may expect that picking a fight with Israel will produce negotiations but it will have the opposite effect. He may think he is approaching a diplomatic breakthrough but, in fact, he is rendering that less likely. Those who fear more “war process” can thus take some solace in the administration's blunders. मामला और अधिक तब बिगडा जब 28 मार्च को अमेरिका और इजरायल के मध्य अच्छे सम्बंध के लिये जाने जाने वाले डेनिस रास को ओबामा प्रशासन के ही किसी व्यक्ति ने बिना नाम बताये आरोपित किया कि वे, “ नेतन्याहू की गठबंधन राजनीति को अमेरिकी हितों से अधिक मह्त्व दे रहे है” । इसी आधार पर विदेश नीति के एक प्रमुख विश्लेषक ने रास की इजरायल के साथ दोहरी स्वामिभक्ति का प्रश्न खडा कर दिया और उनकी नीतिगत सलाह को चुनौती दे डाली।
20.
Fourth, U.S.-Israel tensions increase Palestinian intransigence and demands. Israel in bad standing empowers their leaders; and if the tensions arise from U.S. pressure for concessions to the Palestinians, the latter sit back and enjoy the show. This happened in mid-2009 , when Mahmoud Abbas instructed Americans what to extract from Jerusalem. Conversely, when U.S.-Israel relations flourish, Palestinian leaders feel pressure to meet Israelis, pretend to negotiate, and sign documents. Combining these four presumptions results in a counterintuitive conclusion: Strong U.S.-Israel ties induce irreversible Israeli mistakes. Poor U.S.-Israel ties abort this process. Obama may expect that picking a fight with Israel will produce negotiations but it will have the opposite effect. He may think he is approaching a diplomatic breakthrough but, in fact, he is rendering that less likely. Those who fear more “war process” can thus take some solace in the administration's blunders. मामला और अधिक तब बिगडा जब 28 मार्च को अमेरिका और इजरायल के मध्य अच्छे सम्बंध के लिये जाने जाने वाले डेनिस रास को ओबामा प्रशासन के ही किसी व्यक्ति ने बिना नाम बताये आरोपित किया कि वे, “ नेतन्याहू की गठबंधन राजनीति को अमेरिकी हितों से अधिक मह्त्व दे रहे है” । इसी आधार पर विदेश नीति के एक प्रमुख विश्लेषक ने रास की इजरायल के साथ दोहरी स्वामिभक्ति का प्रश्न खडा कर दिया और उनकी नीतिगत सलाह को चुनौती दे डाली।
