The case was dismissed on Dec 30, 2004, with the judge ruling that US citizens do not have any right to sue a sitting President, based on the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity; that the lawsuit " presents a non-justicable political question; " that the plaintiffs " lack standing to sue on behalf of all taxpayers; " that the plaintiffs " failed to establish the required causal connection between [ their ] alleged injuries and these defendants'conduct; " and that " deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment . " In June 2012, he was disbarred from practicing law in California.
32.
Reiterating its " reluctance to infer that a State's immunity from suit in the federal courts has been negated [, ] stem [ ming ] from recognition of the vital role of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in our federal system, " " Pennhurst State School and Hospital v . Halderman ", 465 U . S . 89, 98 ( 1984 ) ( " Pennhurst II " ), and citing " [ t ] he fundamental nature of the interests implicated by the Eleventh Amendment, " " Atascadero ", at 242, the court held " that Congress may abrogate the States'constitutionally secured immunity from suit in federal court only by making its intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute . " " Id ".
33.
On July 3, 2007, the Court ( through the original three-judge panel ) ruled ( 1 ) that the taxpayer's compensation was received on account of a nonphysical injury or sickness; ( 2 ) that gross income under section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code does include compensatory damages for nonphysical injuries, even if the award is not an " accession to wealth ", ( 3 ) that the income tax imposed on an award for nonphysical injuries is an indirect tax, regardless of whether the recovery is restoration of " human capital ", and therefore the tax does not violate the constitutional requirement of imposts and excises be uniform throughout the United States; ( 5 ) that under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the Internal Revenue Service may not be sued in its own name.
34.
The court held ( 1 ) that the taxpayer's compensation was received on account of a non-physical injury or sickness; ( 2 ) that gross income under section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code does include compensatory damages for non-physical injuries, even if the award is not an " accession to wealth, " ( 3 ) that the income tax imposed on an award for non-physical injuries is an indirect tax, regardless of whether the recovery is restoration of " human capital, " and therefore the tax does not violate the constitutional requirement of Article I, section 9, that capitations or other direct taxes must be laid among the states only in proportion to the population; ( 4 ) that the income tax imposed on an award for non-physical injuries does not violate the constitutional requirement of Article I, section 8, that all duties, imposts and excises be uniform throughout the United States; ( 5 ) that under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the Internal Revenue Service may not be sued in its own name.
35.
On July 3, 2007, the Court ruled ( 1 ) that the taxpayer's compensation was received on account of a non-physical injury or sickness; ( 2 ) that gross income under section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code does include compensatory damages for non-physical injuries, even if the award is not an " accession to wealth, " ( 3 ) that the income tax imposed on an award for non-physical injuries is an indirect tax, regardless of whether the recovery is restoration of " human capital, " and therefore the tax does not violate the constitutional requirement of Article I, section 9, that capitations or other direct taxes must be laid among the states only in proportion to the population; ( 4 ) that the income tax imposed on an award for non-physical injuries does not violate the constitutional requirement of Article I, section 8, that all duties, imposts and excises be uniform throughout the United States; ( 5 ) that under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the Internal Revenue Service may not be sued in its own name.
