Since no one has yet been able to formulate a clear basis or justification for the existence of such a distinction in mental contents, however, this idea has generally been abandoned in favor of externalist " causal theories of mental contents " ( also known as informational semantics ).
32.
This evidently presupposes the internalist theory of motivation ( i . e . a belief can itself motivate ), in contrast to the externalist theory of motivation, also known as the Humean theory of motivation ( i . e . both a belief and a desire are required to motivate ).
33.
Further, if even brains in vats can correctly believe " I am not a brain in a vat, " then the skeptic can still press us on how we know we are not in that situation ( though the externalist will point out that it may be difficult for the skeptic to describe that situation ).
34.
"' Integral Biomathics "'( Simeonov, 2010a / b, Simeonov et al ., 2012a / b, Simeonov et al ., 2013a / b, Simeonov et al ., 2015 ) is a cross-disciplinary approach, involving both internalist and externalist mathematical biology and biological mathematics based on advanced formalisms only.
35.
If one's own'religion'is attacked, by unbelievers who necessarily conceptualize it schematically, or all religion is, by the indifferent, one tends to leap to the defence of what is attacked, so that presently participants of a faith-especially those most involved in argument-are using the term in the same externalist and theoretical sense as their opponents.
36.
That is, the motivational internalist believes that there is an internal, necessary connection between one's conviction that X ought to be done and one's motivation to do X . Conversely, the "'motivational externalist "'( or "'moral externalist "') claims that there is no necessary internal connection between moral convictions and moral motives.
37.
That is, the motivational internalist believes that there is an internal, necessary connection between one's conviction that X ought to be done and one's motivation to do X . Conversely, the "'motivational externalist "'( or "'moral externalist "') claims that there is no necessary internal connection between moral convictions and moral motives.
38.
His work about phenomenal states exemplifying conscious conception of themselves has been used within R . A . Wilson externalist framework to ongoing research and debate within the study of consciousness ( Boundaries of the Mind : The Individual in the Fragile Sciences, ISBN 978-0-521-54494-8, introducing the clunky acronym TESEE : Temporally Extended, Scaffolded, and Embodied and Embedded ).
39.
He says that " we do not want to award the title of knowing something to someone who is only meeting the conditions through a defect, flaw, or failure, compared with someone else who is not meeting the conditions . " In addition to this, externalist accounts of knowledge, such as Nozick's, are often forced to reject closure in cases where it is intuitively valid.
40.
On the other hand, an amoralist is entirely intelligible to the motivational " externalist ", because the motivational externalist thinks that moral judgments about the right thing to do not necessitate some motivation to do those things that are judged to be the right thing to do; rather, an independent desire such as the desire to do the right thing is required ( Brink, 2003 ), ( Rosati, 2006 ).
