That " how " of intellection, the " how " of one's " personal " relation to the object of thought in other words, the underlying relationship between knower and known is predominantly tacit, difficult to articulate, and therefore not something on which one can easily reflect, which causes it to be all the more potentially consequential in the process of knowing.
32.
A subject " referred . . . to those intellections . . . that had received a name that itself represented a distinct consensus in usage " ( Miksa, 1983a, p . 60 ) and : the " systematic structure of established subjects " is " resident in the public realm " ( Miksa, 1983a, p . 69 ); " [ s ] ubjects are by their very nature locations in a classificatory structure of publicly accumulated knowledge ( Miksa, 1983a, p . 61 ).
33.
He says it is composed of four faculties : The " appetitive " ( the desire for, or aversion to an object of sense ), the " sensitive " ( the perception by the senses of corporeal substances ), the " imaginative " ( the faculty which retains images of sensible objects after they have been perceived, and then separates and combines them for a number of ends ), and the " rational ", which is the faculty of intellection.
34.
Instead of attending solely to the " what " of a topic ( an item of content, a teaching, a matter to be subjected to intellectual mastery and critique as an indifferent object of thought ), the shift involves becoming aware of the " how " of intellection itself specifically of the " how " of one's responsive relationship as person in the world to the object of thought of " how " one personally happens to be relating oneself to it.
35.
"It is being, attained or perceived at the summit of an abstractive intellection, of an eidetic or intensive visualization which owes its purity and power of illumination only to the fact that the intellect, one day, was stirred to its depths and trans-illuminated by the impact of the act of existing apprehended in things, and because it was quickened to the point of receiving this act, or hearkening to it, within itself, in the intelligible and super-intelligible integrity of the tone particular to it . " ( p . 20)
36.
:According to Lord Bacon . . . an idea would be defined as intuitio sive inventio, quae in perceptione sensus non est ( ut quae purae et sicci luminis intellectioni est propria ) idearum divinae mentis, prout in creaturis per signaturas suas sese patefaciant . [ Tr : " An intuition or discovery of ideas of the divine mind, in the same way that they disclose themselves in things by their own signatures, and this ( as is proper to the dry light's Intellection ) is not in [ the field of ] sense perception " .]
37.
If we make passive understanding ( intellection )-the power of abstraction-an end in itself, we become according to Coleridge " a race of animals, in whom the presence of reason is manifested solely by the absence of instinct . " This means that we become slaves to the idols of our own making ( the appearances of things ) " falling prostate before lifeless images, the creatures of his own abstraction, [ man ] is himself sensualized, and becomes a slave to the things of which he was formed to be the conqueror and sovereign ."
