| 31. | Strong Nash equilibrium allows for deviations by every conceivable coalition.
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| 32. | In fact, strong Nash equilibrium has to be Pareto efficient.
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| 33. | It is probably best only to list Nash equilibrium in the list of supersets.
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| 34. | In the coalition-proof Nash equilibrium the private communication is limited.
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| 35. | :: This is assuming everybody else follows the Nash equilibrium.
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| 36. | Nash equilibrium need not exist if the set of choices is infinite and noncompact.
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| 37. | Similarly, Granovetter cited the Nash Equilibrium game in his papers.
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| 38. | The interesting challenge in such a game is to find a Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
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| 39. | This is because it may happen that a Nash equilibrium is not Pareto optimal.
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| 40. | The existence of a Nash equilibrium is equivalent to r having a fixed point.
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