One way to think about the difference between an illocutionary act ( e . g ., a declaration, command, or a promise ), and a perlocutionary act ( e . g ., an insult or a persuasion attempt ) is to note how in the former case, by uttering the object for example, " I hereby declare, " or " I command, " or " I hereby promise you " the act has taken place.
42.
According to Austin's preliminary informal description, the idea of an " illocutionary act " can be captured by emphasizing that " by saying something, we " do " something ", as when someone issues an order to someone to go by saying " Go ! ", or when a minister joins two people in marriage saying, " I now pronounce you husband and wife . " ( Austin would eventually define the " illocutionary act " in a more exact manner .)
43.
According to Austin's preliminary informal description, the idea of an " illocutionary act " can be captured by emphasizing that " by saying something, we " do " something ", as when someone issues an order to someone to go by saying " Go ! ", or when a minister joins two people in marriage saying, " I now pronounce you husband and wife . " ( Austin would eventually define the " illocutionary act " in a more exact manner .)
44.
According to Austin's original exposition in " How to Do Things With Words ", an illocutionary act is an act ( 1 ) for the performance of which I must make it clear to some other person that the act is performed ( Austin speaks of the'securing of uptake'), and ( 2 ) the performance of which involves the production of what Austin calls'conventional consequences'as, e . g ., rights, commitments, or obligations ( Austin 1975, 116f ., 121, 139 ).
